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Abstract 
In the pages of this journal there has been considerable discussion regarding the development 
of tools for valuing the multiple attributes that arise from complex interventions with benefits 
beyond health. However, unlike the rigorous underpinnings of cost-utility analysis, much of 
this work has been taking place in fragmented research communities and without theoretical 
underpinnings, leading to a call for better and more comprehensive frameworks. We discuss 
the challenges faced by economic evaluation using as our example a ‘social prescribing’ 
intervention, a novel health intervention based on the social model of health. We suggest, a 
mixed-methods approach to uncover important attributes and then combine tools from health 
economics and economics to provide measures of benefit in a common money numeraire. 
This approach provides the theoretical underpinnings necessary for deliberate, transparent 
and structured decision-making processes. It also enables the correct allocation of costs 
within complex payment systems. We suggest that, due to the complexities of RCTs, 
interventions should be introduced in a way that allows the application of causal analysis for 
evaluation. In the short-term, such evaluations may be challenging and expensive. However, 
as has happened with health economics evaluation and the QALY, when a common sets of 
attributes is agreed upon the expense will fall and these methods can become embedded in 
interventions with diffuse outcomes. 
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Highlights: 
•    The literature has called for comprehensive frameworks that can accommodate multiple 
attributes. This paper considers the challenges of applying economic evaluation to complex 
interventions using the example of a novel health intervention based on the social model of 
health.  
•    It has been suggested that multi-criteria decision analysis and value frameworks lack 
theoretical underpinnings. We combine tools from health economics and economics, with 
theoretical underpinnings, in order to value health and outcomes or attributes beyond health 
in a common numeraire.  
•    We suggest that important attributes should be identified through mixed-methods 
approaches and valued at the population level. 
 
 
Concise summary 
We suggest a method for combining health and non-health attributes into a common 
numeraire in an economic evaluation and the implications for such a method. 
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Introduction 
Nearly 40 years since the initial development of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) [1], 
methods for the evaluation of healthcare interventions are well-developed [2]. However, as 
Garrison et al [3:pg.212] have observed in these pages, although health gains and the 
resulting cost offsets are “core value drivers of health care interventions”, it is increasingly 
clear that other features of healthcare have value. Because an estimated 70% of health 
outcomes are determined by social factors [4], there is increasing interest, and investment, in 
complex interventions that seek also to address the wider social determinants of health. 
Complex interventions are defined as those comprising a number of essential elements and 
‘active ingredients’ [5]. For example, with some complex interventions the process itself is of 
benefit to the recipients [6]. Other interventions realise individually-determined (self-defined) 
benefits. Yet others have multiple benefits with no one outcome having primacy over overs. 
Diffuse outcomes and wide implications [6] mean that current evaluation methods are not 
easily applied to complex interventions.  
 
In response to the challenge of evaluating interventions with outcomes beyond health, much 
space has been devoted in the pages of this journal to the discussion of methods of valuing 
multiple attributes within a health-care intervention, grouped under the heading of ‘multi-
criteria decision analysis’ (MCDA) [7-11]. Multi-criteria approaches allow the quantification 
of additional attributes alongside the primary criteria (usually health) in a cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) [12] and are gaining currency as a way of addressing the limitations in 
current health technology assessment (HTA) systems [8, 10, 13, 14]. Devlin and Sussex 
[15:pg.4] define MCDA in broad terms as “a set of methods and approaches to aid decision-
making, where decisions are based on more than one criterion, which make explicit the 
impact of the decision on all the criteria applied and the relative importance attached to 
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them”. There is increasing interest, too, in ‘value assessment frameworks’, described by 
Briggs [12] as essentially a form of MCDA (however, others suggest that MCDA is a 
component of value frameworks [9]). Developed in the US, value frameworks attempt to 
value health-care spending in a multi-payer system [7, 9]. Even in single-payer systems such 
as the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) there are often numerous decision-makers [16]. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the UK health-care funding system increasingly resembles a 
multi-payer system, which although initially funded through general taxation comprises 
multiple organisations with no single perspective. The added complexity introduced by multi-
payer systems is encountered by evaluators in the UK with payment-for-
performance/payment for results mechanisms used to fund interventions that seek to tackle 
complex social problems [17]. The most recent variant of payment for performance funding 
for health care is the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB). This model sees public-sector 
commissioners partnering with third-sector social investors or private sector for-profit 
investors with the aim of shifting the financial risks of funding complex interventions away 
from the public sector [17].  
 
Phelps and Madhavan [10:pg.251] have argued, in this journal, that we “need better, 
comprehensive frameworks to assess the value of health that can accommodate different 
values and incorporate multiple attributes”. Much of the development of multi-attribute 
approaches has been taking place in fragmented research communities [14]. Briggs 
[12:pg.1505] suggests that, while the development of multi-criteria approaches has been 
taking place outside of health economics, economic techniques have much to offer (he 
proposes that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) represents the “original MCDA”). We believe that 
the current tools of (health) economic evaluation can be applied to tackle the complexities of 
evaluating complex interventions. In this paper, we address the evaluation challenges posed 
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by complex interventions and suggest how methods with theoretical underpinnings can be 
used to accommodate a range of outcomes. We explore these issues using the example of 
‘social prescribing’, a complex intervention actively promoted in the UK as a solution to the 
problems of funding the increasing costs of caring for patients with long-term health 
conditions (LCTs) and tackling the social determinants of health [18, 19]. Similar 
interventions that attempt to address social causes of ill-health are also becoming more 
prevalent in the US [20, 21]. Despite the enthusiasm for social prescribing interventions, 
largely due to the evaluation challenges posed by their complexity, there is currently no 
robust evidence for their effectiveness or value for money [22, 23]. We begin by describing 
‘social prescribing’. 
 
‘Social prescribing’ interventions  
Social prescribing in the UK takes place within the NHS, a tax funded comprehensive health 
care service free at the point of use. Social prescribing has been embedded in primary care 
services that act as gatekeepers for secondary care. Social, rather than health, problems place 
considerable burdens on primary care, with 20 percent of patients consulting their general 
practitioner (GP) for primarily social problems [24]. Based on the social model of health [25], 
‘social prescribing’ interventions aim to reduce service pressures by allowing primary-care 
practitioners to refer patients to non-clinical services in the community and voluntary sectors 
[26]. Many social prescribing interventions employ a ‘link worker’ (alternative titles include 
‘health trainer’ and ‘community navigator’ [26]). The rationale behind the ‘link-worker’ role 
is that without support navigating and accessing community services can be extremely 
challenging for patients [27]. Social prescribing is an exemplar complex intervention (as 
defined by Byford and Sefton [28]): it targets patients with complex health and social 
problems that are chronic in nature, impact on multiple areas of a person’s life (and, 
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potentially, of their family’s life), and impose significant societal costs; it is characterised by 
a high degree of user involvement; it has multiple, individually-tailored components; its 
recipients are heterogeneous; it has multiple complex goals and multiple complex outcomes 
(targeting physical health, but also social problems such as debt, housing and welfare 
entitlements and more abstract ‘wellbeing’ outcomes); it has multi-agency involvement; and 
the mechanisms through which outcomes are achieved are uncertain.  
 
The Challenges of Evaluating Complex Interventions 
The outcomes of complex interventions include a range of attributes (including health) that 
are diverse and potentially of value to stakeholders, society and/or the individual. These 
attributes, as in our social prescribing example, often, in the language of Sen [29], contribute 
to all the possible functions for a person. Here we suggest how multiple non-health attributes 
and health can be combined in an economic evaluation. We then highlight the challenges 
posed by multiple perspectives and the attribution of costs before suggesting how, in the face 
of these challenges, attributes should be selected. 
 
Combining health and non-health attributes 
Garrison et al [3:pg.215] assert that it should be possible to incorporate into economic 
evaluations a range of valuable attributes “by adding their valuations to those of the ‘core’ 
elements of value”. They go on to observe that evaluators must choose whether to use patient 
or population valuations before converting them into a common numeraire. We suggest that 
the current tools of (health economic) evaluation can be applied in combination to allow both 
health and further attributes to be combined into a single outcome, measured in a common 
numeraire, preferably, we argue, money. Using a money numeraire would maintain 
consistency, reduce the cognitive burden placed on decision-makers and provide insights into 
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allocative efficiency (where the marginal benefit of one extra unit of spending is equal across 
programmes). Further, valuing all attributes in monetary terms allows stakeholders to 
converge on a negotiated decision by creating a ‘market’ of prices [10]. 
 
Monetary values could be assigned to both health and non-health attributes using Discrete 
Choice Experiments (DCEs) [14, 30]. Briggs [12] argues that DCEs are a form of multi-
criteria analysis based, as they are, on attributes and levels of attributes that are important to 
an individual’s utility function. Sacrifice and opportunity costs are key concepts in an 
economic evaluation (and can be lacking in some forms of multi-criteria analysis [12]). A 
major strength of DCEs is that they elicit preferences across alternatives using a range of 
scenarios, allowing attributes to be traded-off and allowing decision-makers to observe the 
weights applied to different attributes by the population. Furthermore, if a CBA approach is 
taken, health can be included as an attribute in its own right, allowing individuals to trade-off 
all attributes. 
 
Alternatively, if an evaluator wishes to retain an extra-welfarist focus and consider health 
separately, DCE and CUA approaches can be combined to find a common numeraire. Health 
gains could be valued using QALYs that can be converted into a monetary numeraire through 
the use of thresholds applied by bodies such as the UK National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE), or from the willingness to pay for a QALY [6, 31].  This approach, 
however, would not allow individuals to trade-off health against other potentially desirable 
attributes. 
 
Alternatively, the common numeraire could be health. This could be achieved by converting 
the monetary valuations of the attributes into QALYs, again via the use of a threshold. Unlike 
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combining attributes and health using a monetary numeraire that is focused on the demand 
side (opportunity costs in terms of foregone consumption), this latter approach provides a 
QALY total for the intervention. Subsequently, a supply-side threshold could then be applied 
to the whole intervention, representing the opportunity costs in terms of health forgone if the 
intervention is funded. We return to a consideration of supply-side issues below. 
 
Challenges to the extra-welfarist perspective posed by moving beyond health as a primary 
outcome mean that it may be preferable to return to welfarism’s focus on individual 
preferences, or, at the very least, extend the extra-welfarist perspective. It is to this debate we 
now turn with a consideration of whose perspective should be incorporated into an 
evaluation.  
 
Whose perspective? 
Combining health and other attributes, as described above, raises a number of normative 
challenges for economics evaluations in terms of the perspective of an evaluation: Should the 
extra-welfarist decision maker approach of CUA be maintained over the welfarist approach 
of CBA? How should costs be accounted for? And how should attributes be selected and 
valued?  
 
When combining health and non-health attributes it may be possible to extend the extra-
welfarist notion of functionings and capabilities [29] beyond health. The decision maker 
philosophy of Sugden and Williams [32] allows the incorporation of a wider range of 
stakeholders who could select the important attributes of treatment to be the relevant 
arguments in the objective function (that is, what is to be maximised). Including key 
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attributes beyond health in the objective function would counter the criticism that extra-
welfarism places too much focus on health [33, 34]. 
 
However, as interventions have become more complex in terms of outcome, they have also 
become more complex in terms of delivery. Figure 1 demonstrates the range of stakeholder 
perspectives in our social prescribing example. The social prescribing SIB we describe here 
links primary care providers and commissioners, a social investor, an intermediary (a ‘special 
purpose vehicle’ (SPV)) whose role is to contract service providers, receive investments and 
make outcomes payments), service provider organisations, services users and voluntary and 
community sector organisations (who provide the activities to which service users are 
referred by link workers) (see Figure 2). In this model the social investor provides capital (via 
the SPV) for service provider organisations to deliver the intervention to the population in 
need (the service users). The Commissioner (in this case the Clinical Commissioning Group), 
who is funded from the NHS budget, repays the social investor if pre-determined outcomes 
are achieved – such as a reduction in secondary care costs. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Social prescribing programmes pose a further challenge for evaluators in that they are 
locally-based, with different structures being applied to different areas to reflect the local 
needs, the diverse populations and the existence (or not) of a voluntary sector. Stakeholders 
in one community may chose different attributes compared with other stakeholders in other 
communities. In a centralised system such as the UK NHS, it may become impossible, even 
at a practical level, to extend the decision maker approach to accommodate wider attributes. 
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It may, however, be more possible in fragmented systems where local economics evaluation 
are possible. 
 
So from whose perspective should values be decided? With outcomes beyond health, 
externalities and altruism affecting the monetary valuations of the attributes we suggest 
moving away from the extra-welfarist perspective to the classic welfare economics approach 
of individual preferences. By using individual preferences it is possible to obtain a population 
average valuation of the benefits of treatment and so apply a societal perspective to the 
analysis as used by evaluators in the areas of transport and environment [35]. Moreover, for 
complex interventions aimed at producing change in a range of areas, the societal level is the 
only perspective that can take account of a range of possible externalities. If health 
interventions are affecting, for example, welfare payments, debt management, planning and 
organisation, then these factors will need to be accounted for in the benefits and costs because 
there will be spill-overs from the intervention to the wider public and private sectors.  
 
Whose costs? 
Complex interventions in multi-payer (complex funding) systems may lead to unintended 
consequences if the costs savings/cost burdens follow simplified outcomes targets, whose 
only real advantage is that they are measureable. This risks having outcome targets that do 
not reflect the range of benefits or take account of where the costs savings/increased costs 
may actually occur. Supply-side issues are particularly difficult to resolve when there are 
outcomes beyond health to consider. Once attributes beyond health are introduced as part of 
the benefits to be valued then different sectors (funders) have incentives to cost-shift and free 
ride on other each other. To illustrate, if one important outcome is ‘social care’, in a multi-
payer system should payment fall on the health sector or the social care sector? Where do the 
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opportunity costs lie? For example, if a social prescribing intervention is funded by the NHS 
in the UK, how much health are we willing to sacrifice to reduce the probability of the loss of 
independence?  
 
Within the health sector there have been efforts to estimate health opportunity costs [36]; 
there are no such values for other sectors. For example, there are no values of the opportunity 
cost estimate for social care. As noted above, if the full cost of an intervention comes from 
the health funder it may be possible to consider the health opportunity costs of a programme 
overall, However, as not all benefits are health, should health systems be paying the full cost? 
 
Returning to our example above, in the UK especially, we would expect the marginal cost of 
providing social care to be lower than the marginal cost for health care and we would expect 
the marginal benefits to be higher. Therefore, assessing the opportunity costs across the two 
sectors would be difficult and may highlight a need to re-allocate resources across sectors. 
Garrison et al [3] suggest that including valued attributes beyond health gains in fixed-budget 
systems (such as the UK) is likely to result in changes in relative values (opportunity costs) 
potentially resulting in reduced willingness to pay for health gains at the margin because 
other elements of value are preferred. 
 
The method we suggest, combining the valuation of attributes with QALYs, allows for the 
attribution of cost based on the demand side valuations from the DCE/CUA methods. With 
the use of a common monetary numeraire it is possible to have transparent attribution of 
programme costs that will limit cost-shifting. Costs should occur proportionally to the 
valuations of the benefits. For example, if 50% of the valued benefits from a social 
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prescribing intervention stem from the process of interaction with the link worker, then 50% 
of the costs should be targeted here.  
 
However, while the attribution of costs is helpful it still does not inform us with regard to 
supply side opportunity costs. What is required is a different way to think about funding. 
Complex interventions may need to be matched by different funding structures to account for 
these opportunity cost issues. An example would be a greater use of integrated budgets, so 
that, over time, it would become possible to understand the impact of new interventions in 
terms of overall opportunity costs.  
 
Which, and whose, attributes? 
A central evaluation challenge lies in the actual process of identifying the key attributes that 
should be valued as part of an intervention’s benefits. There are a number of means by which 
intervention attributes are identified, including existing priority-setting frameworks or 
decision-makers’ criteria [15]. Complex interventions are aimed at improving a range of 
outcomes (or attributes). Examples applicable to social prescribing interventions include 
return to work, improvements in subjective wellbeing, reductions in health inequalities, and 
aspects of delivery of health care (‘process’) [15]. Social prescribing interventions are also 
likely to generate externalities; for example, strengthened communities. 
 
We argued above that it would be possible for stakeholders to determine which attributes 
should be part of the objective function. However, such an approach is not without its 
difficulties. Figure 1 illustrates how different attributes may be of particular relevance to 
different stakeholders. Improvements in health are valuable, in and of themselves, from most 
stakeholder perspectives. From the perspectives of providers, payers and planners, health 
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improvements are valuable in leading to a reduction in health-care utilisation and, hence, 
reduced costs. Improvements in dimensions of wellbeing are likely to be valued from the 
perspective of a wider societal good. From certain stakeholder perspectives (payers, primary 
care producers and planner), wellbeing improvements are also likely to be particularly valued 
as leading to a reduction in primary and secondary health-care use.  
 
However, the attributes valued most highly by stakeholders are often the monitored ‘core’ 
outcomes used to judge an intervention’s success [37]. Already, in practice, deciding on core 
outcomes that properly reflect the whole range of potentially valuable attributes is extremely 
challenging [26, 38]. Relevant outcomes are frequently over-simplified. Indeed, research with 
service provider organisations delivering the SIB-funded social prescribing intervention 
suggests that existing outcome measures fail to capture the complex nature of the intervention 
and its range of patient and societal benefits [39]. 
   
While there is a high degree of convergence between valued attributes across the range of 
stakeholders, the ‘process’ attribute is likely to be valued only by patients. This is important. 
If the patient’s perspective is not included in the process of attribute identification, then this 
attribute would be absent from the evaluation. There are a number of models of social 
prescribing, ranging from the ‘light’ (simply ‘signposting’ patients to sources of community 
support) to the ‘holistic’ (intensvie support over a period of months or years from a well-
neworked community link worker trained in behaviour change and motivational techniques) 
[40].  In previous studies, the presence of a link worker is consistently identified by social 
prescribing particiants as playing a central role in their engagement with an intervention and 
in improvements in their wellbeing [41, 42]. If this important attribute is omitted, then an 
intervention’s costs might falsly outweigh its identified benefits. The key implication of this 
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is that attributes need to be identified and valued at the population level, using representative 
samples from the population, as health states currently are. 
 
In terms of selecting the attributes included in any economic evaluation we suggest that 
mixed-methods approaches combing quantitative and qualitative methods - such as Q-
methodology [43] - are likely to be most effective choosing the key attributes to be valued. A 
major advantage of this approach lies in its ability to combine individual preferences and 
stakeholder perspectives within the attribute choice process. Such an approach would help to 
identify a core set of attributes that could applied to all economic evaluations.  
 
Discussion 
In this paper we have tackled the challenges encountered in the evaluation of complex 
interventions, with a particular focus on social prescribing interventions. A limitation of 
multi-criteria approaches is that they are being developed without recourse to theory and with 
the implementation of ad hoc assumptions [9, 12]. This risks the funding of programmes that 
should not be funded and not funding those that should. What we propose here tackles the 
issues of theoretical underpinnings. DCEs and attributes have a strong theoretical grounding 
in the work of Lancaster [44], where individuals purchase goods on the basis of the attributes 
that they provide. This allows the framework to be rooted in welfarism, where individuals 
seek to maximise utility.  
 
However, the question arises: why not simply use Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)? There are 
two reasons: firstly, CBA aggregates a whole programme, so we can obtain a benefit value 
overall but we cannot see how benefits are related to individual attributes. By first 
disaggregating and then valuing attributes we are able to identify what is valued and how 
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trade-offs may occur. Secondly, CBA gives no primacy to health. If evaluators are 
uncomfortable with the welfarist approach our recommendations allow health to be valued 
separately, and still in a QALY framework if necessary, incorporating and extending the 
extra-welfarist dimension that currently exists in health economic evaluation. 
 
A major strength of multi-attribute approaches is that they make trade-offs explicit and 
transparent and bypass some sources of cognitive bias that influence decision-making [10]. 
Health technology assessments do consider other criteria alongside cost-effectiveness in 
decision-making processes. For example, decision-making by NICE in the UK accounts for 
factors beyond increases in length and quality of life, including severity, proximity to end of 
life, stakeholder perspectives, disadvantaged populations and children [45]. However, it is not 
clear the extent to which this list is exhaustive, the weights given to the criteria, and whether 
the criteria are multiplicative or additive [15]. Sculpher [16] stresses that decisions on what is 
valuable are not for analysts to make; this is the role of decision-makers. Evaluations 
generate evidence that reflects decision-makers objectives and constraints. Allowing 
stakeholders to weight attributes according to value may lead to widely differing outcomes; 
however, this can be taken into account by decision makers in a way that is transparent [13]. 
The approach suggested here would increase the extent to which decision-making processes 
are deliberate and structured [16]. Furthermore, by combining values of many attributes there 
may be changes in the relative values of the opportunity costs incurred across sectors 
resulting in a socially acceptable diversion of health-care spending towards social spending, 
or the greater use of integrated budgets.  
 
Finally, consideration needs to be given to the implementation of interventions. With the low 
power/low recruitment problems associated with RCTs, new interventions require thoughtful 
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planning to allow the application of causal inference to large datasets. Such approaches may 
be natural experiments exploiting geographical and/or temporal differences, or discontinuity 
designs that allow for the comparison of exogenously determined ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ 
groups [46].  
 
Conclusion 
Complex interventions with multiple outcomes require new methods of evaluation [6]. These 
evaluation methods, tied to benefit measurement from causal inference, mean moving away 
from the traditional model of health economic evaluation alongside a clinical trial. Proper 
evaluation of complex interventions will be expensive and will require extensive data 
collection [47]. However, putting the task into the ‘too difficult and too expensive’ box risks 
funding interventions that are not cost-effective (or failing to fund those that are). Identifying 
key attributes of social prescribing will take time. A ‘clean slate’ approach [15:pg.48] is 
needed through which we seek, using the tools suggested here, to identify a relevant set of 
attributes for complex interventions and to establish values for those attributes. However, 
once identified a generic instrument could be developed much-reducing the costs of future 
evaluations.  
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